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YOGYAKARTA'S *COLT KAMPUS* AND *BIS KOTA* TRANSIT SYSTEMS: INFRASTRUCTURAL TRANSITIONS AND SHIFTS IN AUTHORITY

Sheri Lynn Gibbings, Elan Lazuardi,
Khidir Marsanto Prawirosusanto,
Emily Hertzman, and Joshua Barker

We met Roy at his house in Yogyakarta city, Central Java. Roy is the middle-aged son of Colonel Hariyadi, a military official who became a major player in the *colt kampus* and *bis kota* (city bus) transportation systems in Yogyakarta city in the 1970s and 1980s. The *colt kampus* system used covered Mitsubishi Colt pickup trucks to move people around the city, while the newer *bis kota* system used large, modern buses. Hariyadi owned a private company that operated many buses in the *colt kampus* system, but in the late 1970s he helped to establish the *bis kota* system and became an important player in setting up a new cooperative—KOPATA (Koperasi Pengusaha Angkutan Kota, City Transport Cooperative)—that would oversee its operation. As we learned from Roy, the *colt kampus* system had an informal security force, while

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KOPATA formalized security for the *bis kota* system.¹ Many of the individuals who worked informally to provide security for *colt kampus*, and who were once considered “thugs” (*preman*), were nevertheless trained by the police and reported directly to KOPATA’s leaders. The transition to the *bis kota* system under the cooperative model also excluded some of the previous *colt kampus* operators, mostly individuals who were of Chinese descent.

In this article, we argue that this transportation-infrastructure transition provided an occasion for the government and key players to shift the structures of authority associated with these systems in a manner that was consistent with larger political shifts taking place in Indonesia in those years. We show how, as Yogyakarta’s *colt kampus* system transitioned to the *bis kota* system, the previously informal security guards were formalized and professionalized. This mirrored a broader shift in the organization of local security across Indonesia, which saw the army and the police seek to displace or control informal actors operating in this domain. The transition from *colt kampus* to *bis kota* also allowed the government and other key players to remove Universitas Gadjah Mada’s (UGM) student union as a key player in the business, despite the union’s involvement in establishing the earlier *colt kampus* system. This step was consistent with the government’s so-called “campus normalization” scheme, which started in the late-1970s and sought to depoliticize university campuses and undermine activist student groups. As noted above, the transition also allowed powerful players to exclude from the new bus system the ethnic Chinese businessmen who, until that time, had been able to play a role in operating the *colt kampus* system. This was part of a wider trend of *pribumi* (indigenous Indonesian) actors trying to curb the role and influence of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in the economic sphere. The changes that took place during the transition from *colt kampus* to *bis kota* thus can be seen as part of a larger process of consolidating power in the hands of the local elite, while curbing the influence of the student unions and the ethnic Chinese—shifts that others have noted were taking place across Indonesia in this period.²

This paper is based on interviews, participant observation, and archival research in Yogyakarta city from August 2014 to September 2017. The research was conducted by a team of researchers associated with UGM, Wilfrid Laurier University, and the University of Toronto.³ This team conducted interviews and participant observation with various actors involved in the *colt kampus* and *bis kota* systems, such as drivers, owners, operators, and passengers. News reports were collected from newspapers, such as *Kedaulatan Rakyat* and *Kompas*.

¹ Interview with Roy, son of Colonel Hariyadi, September 7, 2016. We have changed the names of the people we interviewed and with whom we conducted participant observations. Names of government officials that appeared in newspapers remain unchanged.

² See: John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 45–48; and Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox, 2009), 274–75.

³ The research was supported by an Insight Development Grant from Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

Infrastructures and Informal Sovereignties: A Theoretical Framework

In recent years, social and cultural anthropologists have noted that, although infrastructures often appear apolitical and administrative, they are an important site for political questions on citizenship.⁴ In an ideal world, governments would provide all citizens with access to urban infrastructures in an equal and fair manner. In reality, however, many citizens are left trying to access water, roads, and sewage systems through political channels or informal authorities.⁵ For example, in Indonesia both informal and formal actors require individuals to pay levies to access roads and businesses to pay fees for protection.⁶ Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken describe how, in Aceh, “ordinary soldiers and policemen routinely demanded payments from drivers of vehicles who drove through their checkpoints, or they stole money, household goods, livestock, and other valuables from ordinary citizens’ homes and farms when they raided villages in their hunt for separatist rebels.”⁷

While studies of urban infrastructures have begun to acknowledge the role of informal authorities in shaping citizenship, the question of which authorities have the power to shape and control urban infrastructures, as well as people’s access to those infrastructures, has been left relatively unexplored. In many countries, governments do not maintain a monopoly on urban infrastructures and, increasingly, private companies, cooperatives, and other groups are playing a larger role in infrastructural creation and maintenance, generating a debate on how infrastructures should be governed.⁸ Historically, informal and formal actors have both governed simultaneously in Indonesia,⁹ but the authoritarian President Suharto (1967–98) worked hard to control and discipline informal leaders throughout his time in power.¹⁰ In this paper,

⁴ See: Vandana Desai and Alex Loftus, “Speculating on Slums: Infrastructural Fixes in Informal Housing in the Global South,” *Antipode* 45, 4 (2013): 789–808; Antina von Schnitzler, “Citizenship Prepaid: Water, Calculability, and Techno-Politics in South Africa,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, 4 (2008): 899–917; and Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013): 327–43.

⁵ See: Joshua Barker, “Guerilla Engineers: The Internet and the Politics of Freedom in Indonesia,” in *Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power*, ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 199–218; Nikhil Anand, “PRESSURE: The PoliTechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai,” *Cultural Anthropology* 26, 4 (2011): 542–64; and Nikhil Anand, “Municipal Disconnect: On Abject Water and Its Urban Infrastructures,” *Ethnography* 13, 4 (2012): 487–509.

⁶ Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken, “The State and Illegality in Indonesia,” in *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*, ed. Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), 2–12.

⁷ Aspinall and van Klinken, “The State and Illegality in Indonesia,” 2.

⁸ See: Daniel Mains, “Blackouts and Progress: Privatization, Infrastructure, and a Developmentalist State in Jimma, Ethiopia,” *Cultural Anthropology* 27, 1 (2012): 3–27; Stephen Graham, Renu Desai, and Colin McFarlane, “Water Wars in Mumbai,” in *Infrastructural Lives: Urban Infrastructure in Context*, ed. Stephen Graham and Colin McFarlane (London: Routledge, 2015): 61–85; and Peer Schouten, “The Materiality of State Failure: Social Contract Theory, Infrastructure, and Government Power in Congo,” *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* 41, 3 (June 2013): 553–74.

⁹ Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow—Crime and ‘Order’ in the Colonial State in Java,” trans. Ernst van Lennep, *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs: A Semi-annual Survey of Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Aspects of Indonesia and Malaysia* 25, 1 (January 1991): 74–91, <http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6327>, accessed November 15, 2017.

¹⁰ See: Joshua Barker, “State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s New Order,” *Indonesia* 66 (October 1998): 6–43; James T. Siegel, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); and Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order?” *Indonesia* 66 (October 1998): 45–73.

by describing the transition from *colt kampus* to *bis kota*, we argue that the transition in infrastructures from one system to another provided the local indigenous elite with an opportunity to consolidate power and develop new systems of authority that were in their interest.

Sovereignty is typically understood as unlimited rule by a state that claims legal power over a territory and a population.¹¹ Yet the world is not simply divided into discrete, sovereign nation-states. Rather, it is a complex composition of political authorities with an often tension-filled mix of state and non-state actors.¹² Gangs, vigilantes, and private security commonly lay claim to the kinds of authority traditionally monopolized by the state.¹³ While the literature on sovereignty has focused primarily on criminal networks and privatized security regimes, we argue that sovereignties are not all alike, and are, in fact, composed of different ways of life and social formations, making it imperative to also understand the roles that both new and old actors, such as cooperatives, take up in the shifting infrastructural landscape. Like criminal gangs and privatized security, these other informal sovereignties are important sources of authority.

Caroline Humphrey studied the *marshrut* taxi system, a mafia-run public transportation system in the Russian city of Ulan-Ude. By tracing the local history of how an informal group was able to take over this taxi infrastructure, Humphrey was able to develop a theory of “localized forms of sovereignties.”¹⁴ She argues that past theories of sovereignty have been too general and prescriptive, and that there is a need to understand the “actualities of relations” that exist under conditions of sovereignty.¹⁵ In a similar fashion, in this article we describe the particular ways of life, characteristics, and aesthetics of “localized sovereignties” that emerged around Yogyakarta’s transportation system in the 1970s and 1980s, and how the transition of that basic infrastructure provided members of a local indigenous elite the occasion needed to consolidate their economic and territorial power.

Consolidation of Power among Indigenous Elites, 1970s and 1980s

Before describing the shifts in authority that took place in Yogyakarta’s public transport system with the transition from *colt kampus* to *bis kota*, it is helpful to

¹¹ John Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (2005): 437–61.

¹² See: Daniel M. Goldstein, “In Our Own Hands’: Lynching, Justice, and the Law in Bolivia,” *American Ethnologist* 30 (2003): 22–43; Rivke Jaffe, “The Hybrid State: Crime and Citizenship in Urban Jamaica,” *American Ethnologist* 40 (2013): 734–48; and Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, “Introduction: State in Society in Indonesia,” in *State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia*, ed. Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2009), 1–16.

¹³ See: Thompson Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Thompson Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, “Sovereignty Revisited,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 35 (2006): 295–315; David Pratten and Atreyee Sen, eds., *Global Vigilantes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); and Daniel Jordon Smith, “The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence, and Political Imagination in Nigeria,” *Cultural Anthropology* 19, 3 (2004): 429–55.

¹⁴ Caroline Humphrey, “Sovereignty,” in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*, ed. David Nugent and Joan Vincent (Malden: Blackwell Publications, 2004), 420.

¹⁵ Humphrey, “Sovereignty,” 420.

understand some of the broader economic and political transformations taking place at the national level from the 1960s and into the 1980s. When Suharto came to power in 1967, many generals assumed important roles in the world of business. As Robison and Hadiz note, “military companies were developed usually in conjunction with Chinese business partners, many of whom had long-standing relations with the ‘business’ generals, in some cases stretching back to the 1950s and 1960s when they had jointly operated trading and transportation companies, banks, and other enterprises.”¹⁶ Many of these military-owned businesses ran plantations, airlines, and transportation companies. However, they were unable to develop because of a “lack of maintenance and investment.”¹⁷ At the national level, then, the military’s commercial interests were concentrated in a “smaller number of entities,” with military equity in these partnerships continuing to lessen overtime.¹⁸ In contrast, “a vast network of Chinese wholesalers, retailers, and small manufacturers and service industries dominated the countryside and small towns across the region.” This network of business people of Chinese descent was important because it bolstered the economic growth of Indonesia and generated funds for Indonesia’s political factions and the military.¹⁹

Robison and Hadiz describe how private commercial empires started to emerge in the 1970s and how, by the 1980s, Suharto’s children became important actors in the business environment of Indonesia. *Yayasan* (charitable foundations) were an important addition to this commercial empire because they were “immersed directly into the world of commerce.” Robison and Hadiz argue that *yayasan* “crystallized the relationship between state authority and its ascending politico-business families” because they provided both off-budget political funding and a mechanism to promote private commercial interests for these families. Members of Suharto’s family and their close business associates were directors and office-holders of important *yayasan*.²⁰ These *yayasan*-based ventures allowed private business empires to develop in the 1980s as Suharto’s family members and other important families and government ministers were able to build enterprises that involved military officers and important Chinese business figures.²¹ Robison and Hadiz argue that “replication of this pattern occurred down the chain of political families from the central government to the regions and provinces.”²² In the 1980s, there was a consolidation of the *pribumi* business groups when the government was able to allocate contracts for supply and construction to these groups.²³

This paper tells a small piece of that story: how transportation systems (in this case, bus services), as a form of urban infrastructure, enabled elements of the

¹⁶ Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 54.

¹⁷ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 54.

¹⁸ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 55.

¹⁹ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 55.

²⁰ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 57.

²¹ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 58.

²² Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 58.

²³ Although the change in policies was meant to support this weak economic group, many of these small *pribumi* groups were pushed aside as more powerful politico-business families associated with Suharto and his family took over; see Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia*, 59–60.

indigenous elite to consolidate power at the local level. We describe how a small group of retired military officers and individuals associated with a university was able to solidify their role economically in the city by starting a new bus system. The group, headed by ex-military officers, was then able to shift the “vehicle” of this transportation system from private businesses to cooperatives, which excluded the ethnic Chinese and solidified their own role as the main power brokers over this system. We argue that the cooperative system allowed *pribumi* business interests to be favored over all others, especially those of the Chinese, as the military and other *pribumi* associated with the university were able to establish themselves as the key players overseeing Yogyakarta’s bus systems. The controlling group was also able to consolidate the lower levels of power—that of informal sovereignties, which unofficially controlled territories across the city.

The Emergence of *Colt Kampus*

In the 1960s to 1970s, Yogyakarta was known as *Kota Sepeda* (City of the Bike),²⁴ because cycling was seen as the main mode of transportation. Other than bicycles, *becak* (cycle rickshaws),²⁵ *andong* (horse-drawn carts),²⁶ and *gerobak* (oxen-drawn carts) were also widely used.²⁷ Other forms of transportation, such as buses, served intercity and inter-district (inter-*kabupaten*) links. One of the oldest bus companies at that time was PO Baker (Badan Angkutan Kerjasama Ekonomi Rakyat, Transport Agency for People’s Economic Cooperation), which originally had one route, Yogyakarta–Godean (Sleman), then expanded with another route in the 1970s.²⁸ Automobiles were not used for public transportation in the city in the 1960s.

In the 1970s, however, an informal form of public transportation, called *ompreangan*, emerged. Cahyono—a professor of anthropology at UGM—recalled the time he spent between 1972–73 working as an *ompreangan* driver when he was an undergraduate student.²⁹ Cahyono likened the *ompreangan* to the more recent *taksi gelap* (“dark taxis”),

²⁴ Although the use of bicycles as a mode of transportation has sharply declined, the branding of Yogyakarta as the city of the bike is still common to this day. For example, Yogyakarta’s mayor, Herry Zudianto, tried to revive this branding in 2008 with an initiative called *Sego Segawe* (*Sepeda Kanggo Sekolah lan Nyambut Gawe*, or Bike to Work and School).

²⁵ Interview with Prapto, former *colt kampus* driver, June 9, 2015.

²⁶ *Andong* were also used as public transportation. Nowadays, *andong* are generally used by tourists for private use, and the drivers normally park their *andong* around tourist attractions (from interview with Najib, professor of pharmacy at Universitas Gadjah Mada, April 5, 2015).

²⁷ See: Rizki Beo, “Sejarah angkutan umum di Kota Yogyakarta” [History of public transportation in the city of Yogyakarta], *RizkiBeo the Transporter* (blog), November 10, 2007, <https://rizkibeo.wordpress.com/2007/11/10/sejarah-angkutan-umum-di-yogyakarta-2/>, accessed August 1, 2017; Maria Novena, “Mengintip arsip sejarah transportasi Yogyakarta tempo dulu” [Peek at the transportation historical archive of Yogyakarta’s past], *National Geographic Indonesia*, August 30, 2016, <http://nationalgeographic.co.id/berita/2016/08/mengintip-arsip-sejarah-transportasi-yogyakarta-tempo-dulu>, accessed August 1, 2017; and “Sopir colt kampus sepanjang Senin bersantai-santai” [Colt kampus drivers are relaxing this Monday], *Kompas*, November 13, 1979.

²⁸ “PO” stands for Perusahaan Otobus (bus company) and is used to identify a business as a bus operator. PO Baker has since expanded to other intercity routes. The company was established in 1950, and other intercity bus companies were also established around that time. See Isharyanto, “Bus bertahan dan berekspansi” [Buses survive and expand], *Mas Isharyanto* (blog), July 7, 2015, <https://isharyanto.wordpress.com/2015/07/07/bus-bertahan-dan-berekspansi/>, accessed August 1, 2017.

²⁹ Interview with Cahyono, professor of anthropology, September 18, 2016.

which involve the use of private vehicles for public transportation without the necessary legal permit.³⁰ According to Cahyono, there were only a limited number of cars in the city at the time, some of which were commonly used by governmental offices, such as the administrative department of the municipal government (where his father worked as a department head). Upon retiring, his father bought a second-hand Mitsubishi Willis from his office.³¹ Since his father had never learned to drive, the car was given to Cahyono, who then used it to earn money as an *omprengan* driver after 5:00 PM, because that was when the PO Baker bus stopped operating.³² Most of the time he served a route similar to that of the intercity and inter-*kabupaten* buses, for example, driving to Kaliurang, Solo, or even Semarang. Many of his passengers were traders who commuted from where they lived to a number of marketplaces in Yogyakarta.³³ Cahyono said that there were only four other cars in the city that were used for a similar purpose in the early 1970s. In 1975, the *colt kampus* system was established using Mitsubishi Colt pickup trucks to move passengers through the city along designated routes. As *colt kampus* grew, the *omprengan* operating in Yogyakarta decreased in number and eventually disappeared.³⁴

Central to the establishment of the *colt kampus* transportation system, which arguably became the precursor of Yogyakarta's city bus system, were students at UGM and, as mentioned above, Hariyadi, a former infantry officer. In early 1975, a group of students started to discuss the possibility of campus transportation. This discussion was born out of the need for students to travel back and forth between their residential areas and the campus, which was located in the northern part of the city. This was not the first time that such concerns had been raised. In 1972, a number of student representatives met with L. Soemartono, a member of the city's legislative council (DPRD Kota Yogyakarta).³⁵ In the meeting, the students suggested that the

³⁰ The practice of using private cars for public transportation continues to exist. In Jakarta, for example, the term *mobil omprengan* is used to refer to privately owned automobiles—usually in good condition—that are owned by people who commute by car to work, particularly from satellite cities, and who offer rides to other commuters (either for a fee or free). When Jakarta's "3-in-1" policy was in effect (a rule that required a car traveling on specified roads to be occupied by at least three people), *mobil omprengan* enabled drivers to avoid having to pay for "car jockeys" (individuals who charged a fee to serve as passengers to help drivers meet the 3-in-1 requirement). The 3-in-1 policy was eliminated in May 2016. In recent years, internet apps such as nebeng.com and ompreng.com have been developed to connect *mobil omprengan* drivers and passengers. "*Mobil omprengan*" also refers to cars that are used by drivers whose primary job entails running a taxi service without the legal permit to operate as public transportation.

³¹ Cahyono referred to the car as *mobil dim* because he had to do many repairs on it.

³² On average, he could earn 1,000–5,000 Rp per day, although he could also earn close to nil. Overall, his driving income was higher than the 1,500 Rp per day that he earned working as a teaching assistant at the university. (On March 31, 1975, the US Treasury used a conversion factor of US\$1 = 414.5 Rp.)

³³ Cahyono used to wait for passengers in front of busy places, such as Terban, Jalan Solo, Jalan Wates, Purawisata (Jalan Brigjen Katamso), and Bioskop Mataram (Jalan Doktor Sutomo). To survive as *wong roda* (literally translated as "wheel people"; also means "to have 'street cred'"), he had to rely on informal networks, including *preman* (thugs) who worked at these places as *calo* (brokers), a role that included helping drivers to secure passengers. In his interview, Cahyono admitted that he had to give 10 percent of his earnings to *calo*.

³⁴ Cahyono attributed this demise mainly to his operational costs. Per liter of gas, his *omprengan* could travel only four kilometers (fewer than 9.5 miles per gallon), while *colt kampus* vehicles could travel as far as ten kilometers per liter (about 23.5 mpg).

³⁵ See "Masyarakat Yogyakarta 'kaul' atas kehadiran bis kota" [Yogyakarta people celebrate the presence of city buses], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, November 22, 1979. This article was written after *bis kota* first operated in 1979.

municipal government develop student-oriented transportation. The idea was supported by then-mayor Soedjono AJ, and the municipal government bought seventeen Honda mini pickup trucks. However, before the provincial governor could authorize the new transportation system, Jakarta's Ministry of Transportation ruled that such vehicles were not to be used for human transportation. As a result, the plan was not implemented and the mini trucks were repurposed for the provincial government's use.

Students, however, continued to be interested in finding ways to ease their travel to and from campus. While well-to-do students could afford to travel by motorbike or *becak*, others could not, so developing a mass transit system was seen as an important way to reduce at least this form of socioeconomic inequality among students. Two students, Mudji and Waluyo, both members of UGM's Student Council (Dewan Mahasiswa, DEMA) at the time, took leading roles in developing the *colt kampus* system. Mudji was a civil engineering student, while Waluyo studied archaeology.

By the time of our interview, Waluyo was a professor of archaeology and taught epigraphy, palaeography, and tourism archaeology. He started his undergraduate study at UGM in 1972 and has been teaching there since 1981. Waluyo, being from a lower-middle-class family, initially traveled to UGM by bike, like the majority of people at that time. However, in his second year at UGM, his father gifted him a motorcycle, a Honda C90, to help in his academic achievement. Waluyo became one of the very few students in the Faculty of Literature (Fakultas Sastra) who owned a motorcycle. Unlike many of his friends, therefore, he never used *colt kampus*.³⁶

Unlike Waluyo, Mudji came from a well-off family. His parents were batik entrepreneurs (*juragan*).³⁷ Mudji finished his master's degree in the Faculty of Engineering in 1998. Since then, he has been working as both a consultant and lecturer, and is active in UGM's Center for Transportation and Logistics Studies, as well as the Indonesian Transportation Society (Masyarakat Transportasi Indonesia). With his wife, who is a professor of English Literature at UGM, he also owns a center focusing on human resource training.

Mudji entered UGM almost at the same time as Waluyo. Both were active in student organizations from the faculty to the university level. For a time, Mudji was DEMA's secretary, and then he was the head of BIKEMA (Biro Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa, Student Welfare Bureau), an autonomous body established by DEMA. BIKEMA was no stranger to entrepreneurship and at the time ran several entrepreneurial programs, such as a student canteen (the precursor to what is now known as Foodcourt UGM) and a student cooperative (Koperasi Mahasiswa, KOPMA, which still exists).³⁸ As Waluyo observed, the university was relatively lenient on student activities during that period, and "many students became rich from running businesses."³⁹

³⁶ Interview with Waluyo, former coordinator of the sports and arts division at DEMA, August 28, 2016.

³⁷ Interview with Mudji, former head of BIKEMA (Biro Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa, or Student Welfare Bureau) and former operational chief of KOPATA, September 24, 2016.

³⁸ Interview with Mudji.

³⁹ Interview with Waluyo.

In the early 1970s, after the university completed its move from the southern part of the city to the northern part (from Keraton to Bulaksumur), it was common for students to use either bicycles or *becak* to travel to and from campus. But only those who were rich enough to pay for *becak* could use them. Mudji observed that students who used *becak* usually did not arrive at their campus destination by *becak*, but were dropped off farther away—near the UGM roundabout (*bunderan UGM*)—to reduce the cost. In addition, the fare for the *becak* ride was usually negotiated each time with the driver. There was also an “emotional cost,” as passengers felt pity for the *tukang becak* (rickshaw drivers), especially when riding uphill. BIKEMA wanted there to be a cheaper transportation option, one that could drop students near their faculties without them having to bargain each time. Mudji added that an additional goal was to somewhat mask the socioeconomic gap between rich and poor students, and make them feel united.⁴⁰

As the head of BIKEMA, in 1975, Mudji presented the *colt kampus* plan to the university’s rector, who quickly gave his approval. Although BIKEMA did not receive any financial support from the university, *colt kampus* became one of BIKEMA’s units, with Mudji as its director. Mudji thereafter was involved in designing routes and facilitating communication with the municipal government, particularly Yogyakarta’s DLLAJR (Dinas Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan Raya, Department of Traffic and Road Transportation), which has since become Dinas Perhubungan (Transportation Department). Because BIKEMA did not receive any financial support from the university, the next step was for BIKEMA to find “investors”—as Waluyo put it—to work with them on the *colt kampus* plan.

One major investor was Hariyadi, who developed his own company, PT Dewi Ratih Utami (PT DRU), which became part of the *colt kampus* system. Although Hariyadi passed away in 1997, we spoke about his role in the formation of *colt kampus* with his wife, Sri, son Roy, and daughter Hesti. Roy is a retired landscaper and garden designer whose wife works as a civil servant for the Yogyakarta province. He explained that his father’s family was originally from Turi, Sleman, where Hariyadi’s father had been a member of the Javanese village elite. Besides operating PT DRU, Hariyadi was the landlord for the land he inherited from his family, which Roy said traced its lineage to Sultan Hamengkubuwana VI Yogyakarta (1821–77).⁴¹

In the course of his career, Hariyadi spent several years stationed in MBAD (Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Indonesian Infantry Headquarters) in Jakarta with his wife and children. In the 1960s, however, he moved his family, including eight children, to Sarimulyo, a village in the northern part of Yogyakarta. Upon his retirement from the military in 1972, Hariyadi was offered a position as director of Pelita Air Service—an aircraft company under Pertamina, an Indonesian state-owned oil and gas company. Roy described this role as being “the big boss.” Roy remembered how his family experienced an economic shift once his father occupied this position.

⁴⁰ Interview with Mudji, August 27, 2016. When *colt kampus* was to be replaced by *bis kota*, several newspaper opinion pieces included descriptions of the history of *colt kampus* (e.g., Heru S., “Pikiran pembaca: Soal pick-up mini” [Reader’s opinion: About mini pick-ups], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, January 9, 1978). However, while it was generally agreed that *colt kampus* was developed to help students navigate affordably between their homes and the university, none of the opinion pieces mentioned this social equity goal.

⁴¹ Interview with Roy, August 23, 2017.

Shortly after this change, each of Roy's older brothers received their own cars. Hariyadi continued his career with Pelita in Jakarta for another decade before returning to Yogyakarta in 1982 to live with his family. Later, in the 1990s, he was asked by Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX to become the chairman of the political party Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups) for the Sleman region.



This former *colt kampus* vehicle was repurposed in 2014
(photo by Albertus Vembri, November 8, 2014, used with permission)

Before his permanent return to Yogyakarta, Hariyadi commuted between Jakarta and Yogyakarta. At one point, he agreed with his wife that they should invest in better transportation options for their grown-up children. Hesti, who now lives with her mother, reminisced about her high school days, when she was always driven to school in a Colt station wagon—their first family car, which was bought in 1974.⁴² When Hariyadi was at home in Yogyakarta, he would often use the Colt to also take neighborhood children to school for free. He was aware of the city's inadequate transportation services, and buying this car was the start of his career as an entrepreneur and his entry into transportation services. Thereafter, Hariyadi continued to save his earnings to buy more cars, with Colt pickups being his vehicle of choice (see photo, this page).⁴³

⁴² Hariyadi's widow, Sri, now lives with Hesti in a rich neighborhood in Sleman. Sri spoke well during her interview (August 29, 2016) and did not hesitate to make jokes. Hesti—who is in her fifties—was initially reluctant to say anything about *colt kampus*, because she was worried about giving inaccurate information. She also said that her memory was limited about *colt kampus* because she was only a senior in high school when her father started his business and became an investor in the *colt kampus* system.

⁴³ At the time, pickup trucks were commonly used as cargo cars in Indonesia. The most well-known pickup truck models were the Mitsubishi Colt T100 and, later, the T120, both of which were the first generation of Mitsubishi Delica. The Colt T100 was first imported to Indonesia in 1970 ("Sejarah Mitsubishi Colt T00-T120 di Indonesia" [History of Mitsubishi Colt T00-T120 in Indonesia], <http://www.colt120lovers.com/2013/07/sejarah-mitsubishi-colt-t00-colt-bagong.html>, accessed September 28, 2017). Assembly of the T100 and T120 models was partly done in Nagoya, Japan, by Mitsubishi; and in Jakarta by PT Krama Yudha Tiga Berlian Motors (Wikipedia, s.v. "Mitsubishi Delica," last modified September 13, 2017, 11:51, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsubishi_Delica, accessed August 2, 2017).

Seeing students in his neighborhood who did not have (or could not afford) transportation to travel to school or university, Hariyadi was inspired to start PT DRU, a bus transportation business that initially involved two vehicles that were driven along the *colt kampus* routes. He founded PT DRU in 1975 together with another retired army officer and close neighbor, Colonel Sumartoyo.⁴⁴ Each pickup truck that Hariyadi purchased thereafter was repurposed as a *colt kampus* vehicle. PT DRU also owned six Colt station wagons that people were able to rent.

While Hariyadi and Mudji knew each other, they were not close. Whereas Mudji had developed the framework for *colt kampus*, Hariyadi's PT DRU was the main company that invested in it—by purchasing vehicles for the system, and, as will be discussed below, by drawing on his networks of friends and colleagues as needed to operate the system.⁴⁵ It was this alliance between students and an entrepreneurial army officer that first allowed the *colt kampus* system to emerge.

Colt Kampus's Actors and Operations

In May 1975, BIKEMA officially launched Angkutan Kota Untuk Kepentingan Mahasiswa (city transportation for students), commonly known as *colt kampus*, with five buses. The *colt kampus* fleet quickly grew to fourteen vehicles by the end of 1975. *Colt kampus* initially operated from 6:00 AM to 7:00 PM. There were no dedicated stops for *colt kampus* vehicles; passengers boarded and alighted along the route by hailing drivers or the *kenek* (who assisted the drivers by collecting fare money and helping passengers to enter and exit).⁴⁶ Each Colt pickup truck, including those purchased by Hariyadi, was repurposed by adding a steel roof, doors, and two benches that were arranged facing each other in the truck bed. The pickup truck normally held ten to thirteen adult passengers. Passengers sat on the benches in the back or on the seat beside the driver. Because the vehicle was originally designed to haul cargo, the truck bed's relatively high height from the ground made it difficult for people to get into and out of the back of the truck.

The first *colt kampus* route ran from the south of Yogyakarta city, past Bethesda Hospital to UGM, and then returned to the south via Malioboro.⁴⁷ By requesting (and receiving) university data on where students resided, Mudji and his team were able to map out where most UGM students lived in the different parts of Yogyakarta, and started designing routes (*trayek*) to serve those locations.

⁴⁴ Interview with Roy, September 7, 2016.

⁴⁵ PT DRU was the only one among several transportation businesses in Yogyakarta at the time that cooperated with BIKEMA to make *colt kampus* a success. The other transportation businesses thought that being part of *colt kampus* could not deliver predictable profits. See: "Diskusi kecil warga kota: Bis mini yang akan meneruskan tugas *colt kampus* sebagai angkutan kota" [Locals in discussion: The mini bus that will continue *colt-kampus* as the city transportation], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, October 25, 1979.

⁴⁶ During our interviews, no one mentioned the involvement of women as drivers or *kenek* in the *colt kampus* system. If it existed, it was not common.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mudji, August 27, 2016.

As the system grew from only five vehicles in 1975 to 276 the following year,⁴⁸ more players came into play; hence, *colt kampus* formed its own economy. This economy consisted of vehicle owners, drivers, and *kenek*. PT DRU was likely one of the biggest owners, owning thirty of the cars in *colt kampus*'s fleet. Waluyo recalled that DEMA asked a number of *omprenjan* owners to join the *colt kampus* system by becoming owner-drivers.⁴⁹ He also remembered that one of these individual owners was a rich man who lived in a manor in the center of Yogyakarta, near UGM.⁵⁰ With the sizeable expansion of the *colt kampus* fleet just one year after the system was started, it is likely that there were many more individual owners—both big and small *juragan*—in the *colt kampus* system.⁵¹ At its peak, *colt kampus* also attracted the interest of many ethnic Chinese businessmen who—according to Mudji—bought cars from individual owner-drivers and then hired others to act as drivers.⁵²

While Hariyadi was based in Jakarta for his Pelita job, he assigned Sumartoyo to be PT DRU's coordinator for its *colt kampus* vehicles. PT DRU also started employing individuals from neighboring cities and *kabupaten* to work as *colt kampus* drivers. As Sri put it, PT DRU did not have strict requirements for drivers. Anyone who knew how to drive could apply for the job (“they could just ask”).⁵³ Due to its popularity as a mode of transportation, *colt kampus* also attracted rickshaw and *andong* drivers (*kusir andong*) who wanted to be *colt kampus* drivers.⁵⁴ As many *colt kampus* drivers were coming to work from outside Yogyakarta, Hariyadi even built a “base camp” for these drivers near his family home.⁵⁵

Prapto, a UGM Faculty of Political and Social Science student, was among *colt kampus*'s many drivers who were not from Yogyakarta.⁵⁶ His father was a merchant in Kroya, a small town in Central Java, and owned a Colt pickup truck that was used in his business. Initially, Prapto worked as a back-up driver for a main driver, who happened to be a former thug.⁵⁷ Prapto juggled university life and his part-time job as a back-up driver. Later on he bought his own *colt kampus* vehicle with the help of a loan

⁴⁸ Muslich Zainal Asikin, *Sistem manajemen transportasi kota: Studi kasus kota Yogyakarta menuju pelayanan publik yang aman dan nyaman* [City transport management system: A case study of Yogyakarta towards safe and comfortable public service] (Yogyakarta: Philosophy Press Fakultas Filsafat dan ABHISEKA, 2001).

⁴⁹ Interview with Waluyo, August 24, 2016.

⁵⁰ Interview with Waluyo, August 24, 2016.

⁵¹ This is especially so, given that one of the requirements of being a KOPATA member was owning a *colt kampus* vehicle. In 1979, when the cooperative was yet in its initial years, it had 122 registered members, which meant that there were at least 122 owners of *colt kampus* vehicles.

⁵² Interview with Mudji, September 24, 2016.

⁵³ Interview with Sri, August 29, 2016. Another informant, Sigit, had a friend who once worked as a *colt kampus* driver when they were around fifteen to seventeen years old (interview with Sigit, a high school student during the years that *colt kampus* was active, September 8, 2016). At that time there was no minimum education requirement to be a *colt kampus* driver—unlike the requirement now adopted by the Trans Jogja system.

⁵⁴ “Topik pekan ini: Andong dilestarikan atau dipunahkan?” [This week's topic: Should *andong* be preserved or abolished?], *Kedulatan Rakyat*, December 8, 1979.

⁵⁵ Interview with Roy, September 7, 2016.

⁵⁶ Interview with Yul, Prapto's wife, August 24, 2016.

⁵⁷ Back-up drivers (*supir cadangan*) typically replaced the main drivers on those occasions when the main drivers could not work, such as due to illness or when drivers took a break (usually after working for five consecutive days). Also, when the main drivers reached a certain location, back-up drivers could replace the main drivers to allow them to rest for a while (usually for lunch).

available to students.⁵⁸ Similarly, one of Hariyadi's sons also worked a stint as a driver as a way to increase his income. Hariyadi's wife claimed that a *colt kampus* driver generally earned more than enough income, since the daily fee (*setoran*) that a driver was required to pay to the bus owner was not a lot of money. (According to a former *kenek* of *colt kampus*, a Colt driver had to pay a 6,000 rupiah [Rp] *setoran* to the owner per day.⁵⁹)

As previously noted, in the *colt kampus* system, a driver was commonly assisted by a *kenek*. Rudi, who worked as a *kenek* for *colt kampus*, said that each *kenek* had to alight when the car stopped at Bunderan UGM, where they would be replaced by another *kenek*.⁶⁰ Rudi recalled that, as a *kenek* at that time, he could make 2,000–3,000 rupiah profit per day, which was enough to cover his daily living expenses.⁶¹ Besides *kenek*, there were also *temer* (timers), also sometimes referred to by passengers as *calo* (brokers). The *temers*' job was similar to that of *temers* in the subsequent *bis kota* system: they helped secure passengers and also informed drivers about the time interval between previous *colt kampus* buses.

Along with coordinating the circle of *colt kampus* actors working in the field (drivers, owners, *kenek*, *calo/temer*), BIKEMA also managed the operational side. BIKEMA allocated a bus permit for each *colt kampus* vehicle running at the time. According to an article in *Kompas*, BIKEMA was also one of the institutions that regulated passenger fares.⁶² Before they could start operating within the *colt kampus* system, owners also had to pay 1,500 Rp to BIKEMA for an initial route permit (*ijin trayek*). Some drivers at the time complained that they had to pay two monthly *setoran* for permits: one to BIKEMA and another to the highway department.⁶³

The *colt kampus* system ran from 1975 until 1978, although it gradually came to be replaced by the newer *bis kota* system. With 276 vehicles in operation in 1976, the *colt kampus* system had already reached its peak. It operated on four different routes that were initially developed with regard to UGM's location (Bulaksumur) and the areas where most UGM students lived. Wibowo, a former *colt kampus* driver, said that the routes were signified by different letters (A, B, and C) and the vehicles' different colors (such as red, blue, and cream). There was no bus terminal at the time, but THR (Taman Hiburan Rakyat, People's Park) was used as an informal terminal since it was

⁵⁸ Interview with Prapto.

⁵⁹ Interview with Rudi, former *colt kampus* *kenek*, September 19, 2016. Six thousand rupiah was worth about US\$14.50 in March 1975.

⁶⁰ This location then became a major place for other public transportation modes to wait for passengers (commonly referred to as *ngetem*). Such modes included *bis kota* (Angkutan Perkotaan, Urban Public Transport), *bis antarkabupaten* (Antar Kota Dalam Provinsi [AKDP], Intercities in One Province), and even cabs.

⁶¹ Interview with Rudi.

⁶² "Naik Rp.5,- tarif colt kampus," *Kompas*, November 9, 1977.

⁶³ A number of drivers quoted in a news article also complained that BIKEMA was not transparent about the *setoran* that it received each month (one driver asked, "Where did the money go?"). See "3 Pengemudi katakan: Tarip colt kampus dinaikkan mulai selasa" [Driver said: Colt kampus fare increases starting Tuesday], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, November 3, 1977. In one interview (September 24, 2016), Mudji said that BIKEMA never received any *setoran* payments for its involvement in the *colt kampus* system. However, in an interview a month earlier (August 27, 2016), he said that owners paid some *iuran* (dues) each month to BIKEMA, which BIKEMA then used to pay the students who worked for the *colt kampus* program.

large enough to accommodate a number of *colt kampus* vehicles at the same time and was relatively close to the university.⁶⁴

In addition to being a popular choice among commuters for its economic efficiency, *colt kampus* was regarded as a safe choice for both men and women.⁶⁵ Waluyo also mentioned that, during the *colt kampus* era, it was rare to hear stories of pickpocketing, in contrast to frequently heard stories of pickpocketing on *bis kota*.⁶⁶ Roy asserted that his cousin Sanjaya, who was a notorious thug in the 1970s, was the reason why *colt kampus* was safe: other thugs knew of Sanjaya's relationship with Hariyadi, hence marking *colt kampus* as off limits to thuggery.⁶⁷

Although the *colt kampus* system was up and running in a relatively short time (less than two years), it was not long before that system was disrupted and another one, *bis kota*, was developed in 1979. This new system allowed for the indigenous elite, including many of those involved in the *colt kampus* system, to continue to expand their operations through a cooperative model that excluded the Chinese. Developing the new transportation system also involved forming a new security system, and separating *bis kota* formally from BIKEMA. The shift in the transportation infrastructure thus became a means through which members of the indigenous elite were able to consolidate and formalize their power over Yogyakarta's public transit system.

Developing the *Bis Kota* System

By 1978, BIKEMA was no longer the main operator (*pengelola*) for the *colt kampus* system.⁶⁸ That year, management of the system was transferred to DLLAJR for the Special Province of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta). The reason for this is not clear, but it was likely due to a central government regulation being implemented nationwide that banned student unions. In 1978, the Minister for Education released the ministerial decree (No. 0156/U/1978) called Campus Life Normalization (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK). In 1980, it was followed by another decree (No. 0230/U/J/1980), which provided general guidelines for student organizations and Student Coordination Body membership (Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, BKK). Together, the decrees became known as NKK/BKK.

The ban on student unions was a response to two national student protests: the Malari demonstration and riot of 1974 and the student demonstrations of 1978 that followed Suharto's re-election.⁶⁹ As a result of the ban, DEMA—which had

⁶⁴ Interview with Wibowo, former *colt kampus* driver, October 25, 2014. The park is located at Jalan Brigjen Katamso, about 4.5 kilometers (3 miles) from Bulaksumur.

⁶⁵ Frequent passengers included female students, middle-aged and married women (*ibu-ibu*), and female traders. Despite the perceived safety of *colt kampus*, former *colt kampus* passenger Wati once witnessed a female student being harassed by a *kenek*. After the student alighted from the vehicle, she slapped the *kenek* on his face (interview with Wati, August 31, 2016).

⁶⁶ Interview with Waluyo.

⁶⁷ Interview with Roy, September 7, 2016.

⁶⁸ "Diskusi kecil warga kota," *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

⁶⁹ For more on the depoliticization of campus life, see, for example, Heru Nugroho, "The Political Economy of Higher Education: The University as an Arena for the Struggle for Power," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dakhidae (Jakarta: Equinox, 2005), 143–65.

participated in the 1978 student demonstrations—was soon dissolved.⁷⁰ Mudji, however, lamented that he struggled to keep BIKEMA from being affected by NKK, and later BKK, since BIKEMA's main concern was not political.⁷¹

Following an outcry from the public about a *colt kampus* passenger tariff increase in 1977, the municipal government started to discuss a transition plan from *colt kampus* to a “better” transportation system. In 1970, the Ministry for Transportation had released a ministerial decree on the need for each provincial capital to provide city buses for public transportation.⁷² Compared to cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang, in the early 1970s Yogyakarta did not have its own city bus system with modern buses. While *colt kampus* was initially praised as Yogyakarta's own public transportation system, by 1978 the provincial and municipal governments deemed that *colt kampus* was failing to meet the standards of public transportation for a provincial capital.

In 1978, with increased pressure to develop a new bus system, Yogyakarta's mayor, Ahmad (1975–81), also a former colonel, invited a number of people involved in the transportation industry to discuss how best to address this need, including colonels Hariyadi and Sumartoyo.⁷³ Meeting participants agreed that the *colt kampus* system had become less regulated and more chaotic (*semrawut*) than when it first started because the number of *colt kampus* vehicles had grown so quickly.⁷⁴ Later, Sumartoyo invited his other colleagues—also from the army—to subsequent discussions.⁷⁵ All of these people became involved in the first cooperative formed around what would become the new bus system.

In group discussions, participants considered how Yogyakarta's roads were increasingly becoming congested because of the growing number of vehicles. With the development of a new bus system, they reasoned, one *bis kota* vehicle would replace two *colt kampus* vehicles, since the former had more passenger capacity. The group thus concluded that the new system would decrease the number of vehicles on the road. The plan was subsequently driven by the municipal government's desire to develop a standardized public transportation system,⁷⁶ especially since the transportation minister had previously released a decree on August 5, 1970, that required light trucks—including mini pickups—to be subject to vehicle testing and to be authorized exclusively for freight transport if they had been manufactured for that purpose (thus disallowing conversions for passenger transport).⁷⁷

⁷⁰ Interview with Mudji, September 24, 2016.

⁷¹ Interview with Mudji, September 24, 2016.

⁷² “Sopir *colt kampus* sepanjang Senin bersantai-santai,” *Kompas*; and “Sampai Selasa kemarin, *colt kampus* belum muncul” [Until last Tuesday, *colt kampus* is still not seen] *Kompas*, November 14, 1979.

⁷³ Interviews with Prapto, June 9, 2015, and September 9, 2017.

⁷⁴ In 1978, BIKEMA was required to decrease the size of the *colt kampus* fleet in response to government concerns about traffic congestion. As a result, there were 212 vehicles operating that year. See: Asikin, *Sistem manajemen transportasi kota*.

⁷⁵ Interview with Prapto, September 9, 2017.

⁷⁶ Interview with Mudji, August 27, 2016.

⁷⁷ “Sesudah 30 Juni 1978: Pick-up mini Honda, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Subaru dan sejenis dilarang beroperasi” [After June 30, 1978: Mini pick-ups from Honda, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Subaru and others banned], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, January 9, 1978. In a newspaper article written after *bis kota* first started operating in 1979, L. Soemartono—a member of DPRD Kota Yogyakarta—said that he did not know how *colt kampus*

The DLLAJR for the Special Province of Yogyakarta finally sealed the group's plan by releasing a handbill (*surat edaran*) in January 1978 that banned the use of pickup trucks for passenger transport after June 30, 1978.⁷⁸ The handbill quickly spurred public discussion, including in the newspapers. The general director for land transportation, Nazar Noerdin, agreed that the government did not approve of pickup trucks for public transportation, and that allowing the use of such vehicles for human transport should only be temporary.⁷⁹ He added that the local government should be responsible for the transition from *colt kampus* to the new *bis kota* system, especially regarding the social implications of this plan.

Unsurprisingly, the plan met with negative reactions from *colt kampus* drivers, who worried that they would lose their jobs if *bis kota* started operating. They could not easily become *bis kota* drivers, because most of them had a type A driver's license—for driving cars—while being a bus driver required a type B driver's licence.⁸⁰ Aware of the *colt kampus* drivers' concerns about losing their jobs, Noerdin argued that such job losses should be considered a necessary sacrifice for development (*pembangunan*).⁸¹ When public support for *bis kota* appeared to be growing strong in the city, *colt kampus* drivers stopped working for a couple days, although they did not admit directly that they were on strike.⁸² This protest garnered public attention, which in turn prompted the Military District Command, or Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer), to use their army trucks as a temporary replacement for *colt kampus* vehicles. *Becak* were also said to have had an increase in passengers during the two-day "strike."

Not only were the *colt kampus* drivers (and presumably, by extension, the *kenek*) against the new system; a number of citizens also expressed their concerns about the transition, as seen, for instance, in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* letters from readers.⁸³ A number of readers argued that a vehicle the size of a minibus was not suitable for Yogyakarta, as the city had narrow roads.⁸⁴ Some even expressed their suspicions that the transition was motivated by the municipal government's alleged collusion with a certain car manufacturer.⁸⁵ Others were worried about those owners who had already

had been permitted to operate for the past several years ("Masyarakat Yogyakarta 'kaul' atas kehadiran bis kota").

⁷⁸ "Sesudah 30 Juni 1978," *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

⁷⁹ "Dirjen perhubungan darat: Itu tanggungjawab Pemda implikasi sosial akibat penggantian 'colt kampus'" [General directorate for land transportation: Social implication of *colt-kampus* replacement is provincial government's responsibility], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, October 3, 1979.

⁸⁰ "Penggunaan bis mini: Tepat!" [Use of mini bus: Correct!], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, October 19, 1979.

⁸¹ "Dirjen perhubungan darat," *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

⁸² Regarding the work stoppage, the drivers said they only wanted to rest ("Sopir colt kampus sepanjang Senin bersantai-santai," *Kompas*; and "Sampai Selasa kemarin, colt kampus belum muncul," *Kompas*).

⁸³ The newspaper articles did not mention owners (*temers*) as part of the strike. See, for example: Yunus Syamsu Budhie, "Yogyakarta dan transport umum dalam kota" [Yogyakarta and public transportation in the city], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, April 11, 1977; and Heru S., "Pikiran pembaca: Soal pick-up mini."

⁸⁴ It should be noted that, at that time, people were familiar only with buses like the intercity or inter-kabupaten buses (such as PO Baker's vehicles), which were bigger than the *bis kota* vehicles. Therefore, in the beginning, before the government settled with the minibuses that are now associated with the *bis kota* system, it is likely that the discussion around *bis kota* did not specify the size of the buses.

⁸⁵ For example, a reader questioned the relationship between the local government and Toyota, since one of Toyota's cars was mentioned by the government as being eligible for *angkutan umum* (public transportation). See Mardhiyanto, "Pikiran pembaca: Pendapat saya tentang colt mini (Ngampilan 19, Yogyakarta)" [Readers opinion: My take on mini colt], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, January 9, 1978. Also see

bought Colt pickups to run as *colt kampus*, without knowing that these vehicles were to be banned for passenger transport. In the January 9 edition of *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, a reader's letter said that the government should have been clear about what could and could not be done with certain types and models of vehicles by informing citizens before releasing the handbill.⁸⁶

Perhaps aware of the arguments against *bis kota*, the local government and PT Askrindo Jakarta—a credit/leasing company that had offered to collaborate on the project—made it clear that the transition would benefit small-scale entrepreneurs. In this case, the discourse about shifting the players and authority was made explicit. Furthermore, the local government and PT Askrindo Jakarta emphasized that Yogyakarta's *bis kota* system would not benefit rich entrepreneurs at the expense of older players.⁸⁷ This point was a conscious attempt to avoid the tensions that surrounded Jakarta's transition from old modes of transportation (*oplet* and *angkot*, small sedans and mini-vans) to new ones (*bis kota*, large city buses). According to *Kompas*, Jakarta's transition was rumored to have been motivated by the desire to replace old companies with new ones, since the transition was allegedly made without consulting people from the displaced system.⁸⁸ In Jakarta, the new minibuses operated alongside *oplet* and *angkot* on existing busy, or “wet” routes (*jalur basah*) for *oplet/angkot*, resulting in more people choosing *bis kota*, because the latter were newer vehicles and more comfortable. Similarly, when the transition to the *bis kota* system began to be discussed in Yogyakarta, some people were under the impression that the change was mainly driven by the economic motives of certain players to replace old businesses (*juragan lama*), presumably the Chinese ones.⁸⁹ In any event, the opposition by drivers and citizens was likely the reason the initial plan to have *bis kota* start operating in Yogyakarta by October 1979 was postponed.

A month later, in November 1979, the mayor reiterated Yogyakarta's need to have its own city bus system to respond to the national policy that required each provincial capital to have its own public transportation using buses with a capacity of more than 350 kg.⁹⁰ A governor's decree (No. 066/KD/17) was then released, stating that KOPATA was to be the operator (*pelaksana*) of the new minibus city transportation system.⁹¹ For this new system, the initial tariff was fifty rupiah—about twice as expensive as the *colt kampus* tariff. The municipal government also released details of six new city routes: *bis kota* would start out with two routes, while the remaining four routes would be served by *colt kampus*.⁹² However, the two routes given to *bis kota* were *colt kampus*'s busiest routes (*jalur basah*). No longer being able to operate along the busiest routes was among the reasons that *colt kampus* drivers went on “strike.”

⁸⁶ “RamaI2 soa pick-up mini: Pemerintah diperbudak pabrik pabrik mobil?” [Controversies around mini pick-up: Is the government enslaved by car companies?], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, January 16, 1978.

⁸⁷ Mardhiyanto, “Pikiran pembaca.”

⁸⁸ “Colt kampus jadi bis-mini: Pengusahanya tidak boleh diganti” [Colt campus becomes mini-buses: Entrepreneurs cannot be changed], *Kompas*, November 27, 1979.

⁸⁹ “Colt kampus jadi bis-mini,” *Kompas*.

⁹⁰ See: “Colt kampus jadi bis-mini,” *Kompas*; and Mardhiyanto, “Pikiran pembaca.”

⁹¹ “Sesudah 30 Juni 1978,” *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

⁹² “Sampai Selasa kemarin, colt kampus belum muncul,” *Kompas*.

⁹³ “Bis mini beroperasi mulai 20 November,” *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, November 19, 1979.

Furthermore, these drivers were also concerned because their permits for other routes now included a statement saying, “when mini buses start operating, this permit will be terminated.”⁹³ There was also dissatisfaction that the shift to the cooperative model involved formalizing security arrangements for the system.



Physical appearance of KOPATA buses assigned to route 2
(photo taken by Albertus Vembri, October 17, 2014, used with permission)

Cooperatives: Controlling Informal Sovereignties in the City

While the *colt kampus* system was run by a student union in conjunction with the government and private companies, the *bis kota* system was based on a cooperative model that was no longer closely associated with UGM. As mentioned earlier, this transition was likely due to the fact that the municipal government was concerned about student organizing at universities, and was working to limit the economic and political power of student unions. The government encouraged the creation of cooperatives that operated independently of UGM, although many of the same *colt kampus* actors remained involved. For instance, KOPATA was initially chaired by Sumartoyo, Hariyadi oversaw the company for the first seven years, and Mudji was appointed as the operational chief.

As Revisond Baswir—an Indonesian economist based at UGM—puts it, there are two interrelated characteristics of cooperatives: the social and the economic. The main goal of cooperatives is not merely to collect profits, but also to improve the welfare of their members, who traditionally belonged to lower socioeconomic classes.⁹⁴ Another important feature of cooperatives that distinguishes them from other business entities

⁹³ “Semua angkutan ‘colt kampus’ kemarin lumpuh total” [All of colt kampus was out of action yesterday], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, November 13, 1979.

⁹⁴ Revisond Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Badan Penerbitan Fakultas Ekonomi UGM, [1997] 2000), 2.

is that they are perceived as coming from the people (*gerakan ekonomi rakyat*) and being based on kinship principles (*asas kekeluargaan*). Thus, after independence, cooperatives were viewed as a means to build a strong national economic system.

During the Old Order (Orde Lama), Indonesian cooperatives were mostly established around providing credit and were often associated with agricultural production.⁹⁵ Cooperatives were also closely associated with the ruling party. Thus, during Liberal Democracy, cooperatives were associated with the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI).⁹⁶ Under Suharto's administration, which began in 1967, the central government aimed to "rehabilitate" cooperatives by imposing on them new regulations.⁹⁷ Politically, cooperatives under the New Order were also associated with support for the ruling party, Golkar, through village-based units (*koperasi unit desa*, KUD) across the country. During the Old Order, KOKSI (Kesatuan Organisasi Koperasi Seluruh Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Cooperatives Organization) was filled with people loyal to Sukarno's administration; similarly, between 1966 and 1998, the main management of GERKOPIN (Gerakan Koperasi Indonesia, Indonesian Cooperative Movement) and DEKOPIN (Dewan Koperasi Indonesia, Indonesian Cooperative Board) mostly consisted of members of ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed Forces) and KBA (Keluarga Besar ABRI, the Large Family of the Indonesian Armed Forces).⁹⁸

The cooperatives that were developed in Yogyakarta to operate the bus systems had close ties to individuals who had military backgrounds. Two of the earliest bus cooperatives in Yogyakarta—KOPATA and KOBUTRI (Koperasi Bina Usaha Transportasi Republik Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia Transportation Business Cooperative)—were established and managed by former army members. Baswir attributed the success of the New Order partly to the success of using cooperatives that appeared to be politically neutral to mobilize the masses for political purposes.⁹⁹ Perceptions of cooperatives tended to be negative, however, as citizens saw them as inefficient, corrupt, and largely an extension of the state.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, the

⁹⁵ Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 29, 218.

⁹⁶ In 1959, during Indonesia's Guided Democracy period, cooperatives were also considered to be a means to run the "guided economy," and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) supported the strong growth of cooperatives (Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 219–20). In 1965, for instance, there were about seventy thousand registered cooperatives. (The number sharply decreased after 1965 and the fall of PKI, due to the implementation of law UU No. 12 on the Principles of Cooperatives, Year 1967.) During Sukarno's rule, cooperatives were not autonomous, as the central government had influence over them through placing loyal people within their leadership structures (Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 220–21).

⁹⁷ Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 216, 218–21. In the late 1960s, the central government created cooperatives organized around certain functional groups (*golongan fungsional*), such as civil servants, army members, schools, universities, and *karyawan* (employees). In 1967, out of 22,890 registered cooperatives, 7,875 were organized around functional groups (34 percent), while the rest were village-based units. Thirty years later, in 1997, out of 42,000 cooperatives, about 33,000 (79 percent) were organized around functional groups (Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 216, 218–20).

⁹⁸ Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 220–24.

⁹⁹ Baswir, *Koperasi Indonesia*, 220–24.

¹⁰⁰ For more about cooperatives, see David Henley, "Custom and Koperasi: The Co-operative Ideal in Indonesia," in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, ed. Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 87–112.

formation of the cooperative provided the indigenous elite with the ability to solidify their economic and political control over Yogyakarta's *bis kota* transportation system.

KOPATA: A New Bus Cooperative

The decision to appoint a cooperative instead of a firm (PT or CV) to operate Yogyakarta's bus system was partly justified by the goal of helping small entrepreneurs, especially indigenous entrepreneurs. Nur joined KOPATA in 1979, after being invited to join by a fellow *colt kampus* driver who was already in KOPATA. Nur has been KOPATA's operational chief since 1989, and was seventy-four years old when we interviewed him in 2017. He is originally from Cilacap, and studied economics at UGM in 1982, although he never finished his degree. Before joining KOPATA, he drove his own *colt kampus* vehicle. He succeeded Mudji as the operational chief after assisting him in the field for several years.¹⁰¹ Nur described how "they [investors in *colt kampus*] were encouraged [by the government] to establish a cooperative at that time."¹⁰²

In 1979, the municipal government facilitated KOPATA's initial procurement of a minibus system through a specific credit scheme called Kredit Investasi Kecil (Small Investment Credit) under Bank Bumi Daya and PT Askrindo. The scheme allowed an individual to buy a Daihatsu minibus, for use as a *bis kota* vehicle, for a total of 7.8 million rupiah over four years, with 10.5 percent interest and no down payment.¹⁰³ However, to access this credit scheme and buy a minibus, one had to be a member of KOPATA. To be a member of KOPATA, one had to be a former owner of a *colt kampus* vehicle *and* an indigenous citizen. Both Nur and Mudji agreed that the second requirement was created to make it difficult for ethnic Chinese businessmen, who were assumed to be "rich," from joining the cooperative. Nur said, "In the past, the purpose was really to prevent the Chinese from accessing [the new bus system] because the Chinese have strong capital."¹⁰⁴ Mudji stated that such a requirement was important to prevent what happened when a large number of *colt kampus* vehicles were owned by rich Chinese. Mudji said that many *colt kampus* owners sold their vehicles to Chinese entrepreneurs, who then—according to him—tried to monopolize the *colt kampus* economy. This strong sentiment against the Chinese was made apparent by Mudji saying that he was not interested in making the Chinese richer.¹⁰⁵

During its first three years, KOPATA grew from operating thirty-one to one hundred buses.¹⁰⁶ KOPATA followed the general principle of cooperatives: to improve the welfare of its members.¹⁰⁷ Being a major player in Yogyakarta's urban transportation strategy, KOPATA also developed more businesses (*usaha*). Initially,

¹⁰¹ Interview with Nur, operational chief of KOPATA, June 9, 2015.

¹⁰² Interview with Nur, September 9, 2017.

¹⁰³ "Organda belum mengetahui; rencana pengoperasian bis mini di Yogyakarta. Colt kampus dilempar ke luar kota" [Organda (Organisation for Land Transportat Enterpreneurs) in the dark; plan to operate mini bus in Yogyakarta. Colt-kampus moved to other cities], *Kompas*, September 17, 1979.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Nur, June 9, 2015; and interview with Prapto, October 6, 2016.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Mudji, September 24, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Asikin, *Sistem manajemen transportasi kota*, 41.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Prapto, June 8, 2015.

KOPATA developed Keswabeta, a *simpan pinjam* (a type of credit union), in which each KOPATA member made a monthly deposit (*simpanan wajib*) after making a one-off deposit (*simpanan pokok*) upon becoming a member.¹⁰⁸ KOPATA then developed more side businesses, such as an automobile spare-parts shop, established in 1985 and located in Taman Siswa. A few years later, when phone booths (*wartel* or *warung telepon*) were popular in Yogyakarta, KOPATA opened a phone booth with nine rooms. In addition to members' monthly mandatory savings, KOPATA also collected dues of 2,500 Rp per day from each member. Using the member dues, KOPATA bought a block of land in Ngeksigondo, an area not too far from Kotagede, and built its second office there, to replace the first office (which previously had housed the *colt kampus* headquarters). Perhaps KOPATA's biggest investment was opening a gas station in 1990 in Jalan Raya Wonosari-Yogya, where the current office is located—a site also purchased with member dues. KOPATA's other major investment was renting out its land in Ngeksigondo to a supermarket chain, Superindo, in 2011 for twenty years.¹⁰⁹

While the *colt kampus* system had Hariyadi operating his individual business alongside other owner-operators, the new cooperative system had him controlling overall operations of *bis kota* while Sumartoyo was chair of the cooperative. Joko, KOPATA's head of security (Satuan Pengamanan, *satpam*), described Sumartoyo as a disciplined leader who verified the presence of his employees every morning. Many of the employees welcomed him by saluting and saying "good morning, sir," as they would in a military environment. After spending time in the office, Sumartoyo would then be driven in his private car on one route of the *bis kota* system to make sure that the *satpam* were working well, properly guarding the right places, and that the buses were not overlapping. On the street, he would not get out of his vehicle; he would only pass by in his car because later he would receive a detailed report about *bis kota* drivers and field operations from Joko, along with reports written by others. When all of the field reports were completed and collected, they were placed within two portfolios and delivered directly to Sumartoyo's house by his driver.¹¹⁰ When Sumartoyo was not happy with a report he would draw on it a picture of a sickle (*parang*) and sign the paper in very large writing. When that happened, Joko said he had to change the report. Joko concluded that many of KOPATA's members were afraid of Sumartoyo while they were doing their work, although Joko said he thought that the colonel had a good heart (*baik hati*).¹¹¹

Creating the cooperative system allowed members of KOPATA to consolidate their power over the transportation system while Chinese businessmen were excluded. As previously mentioned, only *pribumi* who had invested in *colt kampus* were allowed to join KOPATA. For example, Prapto was a former *colt kampus* driver who accessed a KOPATA credit scheme for university students, which allowed him to obtain his first *bis kota* bus in 1980. Mulyanto, who already had a job as a civil servant when *colt kampus* was being formed, saw a business opportunity in *colt kampus* and invested in it. He also joined KOPATA when it was founded. Like many other *bis kota* bus owners, he

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Prapto, June 8, 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Prapto, October 6, 2016.

¹¹⁰ If a report did not get delivered to Sumartoyo, the driver would be beaten up by Sumartoyo or Joko. Interview with Joko, KOPATA's head of security, December 9, 2016.

¹¹¹ Interview with Joko.

bought his first bus through a credit scheme. He acquired enough capital from owning one bus to buy two more.¹¹²



ASPADA bus on route (photo by Albertus Vembri, November 8, 2014, used with permission)

KOPATA did not, however, have a monopoly over the *bis kota* system. After KOPATA's formation in 1979, other cooperatives appeared on the scene, such as the aforementioned KOBUTRI (1982), ASPADA (Asosiasi Pengusaha Angkutan Daerah, Local Transportation Business Association) (1986), and PUSKOPKAR (Pusat Koperasi Karyawan, Employee Cooperative Unit) (1986). Each had their own members and transportation routes, and some connection to the government and military. For example, Pak Sudirman was stationed in East Timor with the national army when a relative suggested that he return to Jogyakarta and get involved in the transportation industry.¹¹³ Many retired army officers were doing that, and in 1996 prospects were still very good for investing in buses for the small but growing city.

It was through the transition to the cooperative system then that a group of indigenous entrepreneurs—composed of former military officials, civil servants, and university students—were able to bolster their role in the *bis kota* system while excluding the ethnic Chinese. Moreover, along with consolidating their personal power and prestige, KOPATA's members helped to control thugs in the city by organizing them formally under the auspices of the cooperative.

Formalizing Security

Shortly after KOPATA was formed, it established a new way of organizing an informal security force, whose main task was to ensure that KOPATA buses ran smoothly and safely. *Satpam* were not members of the cooperative, but were individuals hired to provide security. Joko was very young—still in his early

¹¹² Interview with Mulyanto, former KOPATA member, September 11, 2016. Mulyanto, seventy-two years old at the time we interviewed him, now owns a grocery store (*toko kelontong*) in Giwangan.

¹¹³ Interview with Sudirman, head of KOBUTRI, May 31, 2015.

twenties—when he was first recruited as a *satpam*. Before working in KOPATA, he was involved in motorbike racing. Despite Joko's interest, his parents did not want him to pursue a career in the military. They said it was enough to have one family member in the army, namely, Joko's older brother, Yohanes, who had a close relationship with Sumartoyo and also cofounded KOPATA.¹¹⁴

In the early 1980s, thirty-seven individuals, including Joko, were recruited as *satpam*.¹¹⁵ At the time of his interview, Joko recalled that the KOPATA security guards were among the first *satpam* in Indonesia to be trained by the police. During the training, Joko recalled that he was required to have a military-style haircut (*potong bros*), and that he was forced to run daily, even though he was only given one meal per day. Joko described how the exercises taught the *satpam* discipline so that these future security guards could face any problem that they might meet on the street. The exercises followed the same educational system used by the police; once recruits passed their training, they received a certificate (*ijazah*) from Polda (Polisi Daerah, Indonesian Regional Police).

After this training, Joko was appointed as KOPATA's head of security and worked at the main *bis kota* terminal in Umbulharjo from 1979 until 2004. Joko had an office there, from which he could monitor bus operations and help drivers or their assistants in the event of an accident or security problem. Other *satpam* were assigned specific spots along the bus route, particularly at busy locations. Their duties were to oversee *bis kota* operations and to support KOPATA's interests and bus drivers when accidents occurred. *Satpam* reported *bis kota* drivers who disobeyed the regulations, such as running traffic lights, running off-schedule, and racing (*kebut-kebutan*) other drivers.

Buses at the terminal departed when Joko gave drivers the command to leave; they set off slowly and tooted their horn as they left the terminal. Departures were staggered and the buses traveled on different circuits, with buses returning to the terminal to drop off and pick up passengers at five-minute intervals. Joko was always watching the clock on the office wall. When drivers arrived late, they would get a sanction (*perpal*), and the bus would be stopped for a few minutes before it could operate again. The practice of making buses wait was used only during non-peak times. The *satpam* would say “*mbuka selokan*,”¹¹⁶ for instance, which meant that the bus would only be taking passengers after it reached Selokan Mataram (Mataram Drainage). This shortened route meant that the drivers would lose income from passenger fares. To record *perpal*, *satpam* usually had a control card (*kartu kontrol*).

One of the regular problems with *bis kota* that did not happen as often during the *colt kampus* era was pickpocketing (*pencopetan*) and passengers' complaints about losing

¹¹⁴ Yohanes, who retired from the Corps Polisi Militer (Military Police Corps), died in 1985—only about six years after KOPATA was formed. He helped establish KOPATA along with Mudji, Sumartoyo, and Hariyadi. He was appointed KOPATA's head of *keamanan* (security). To make sure that KOPATA buses ran smoothly, Yohanes recruited a number of *satpam*, including Joko. Joko described Yohanes as a disciplined and professional man. As was the case with Sumartoyo, Joko described Yohanes as bringing to KOPATA a military style of leadership that was characterized by a high degree of discipline.

¹¹⁵ By 2016, there were only about three *satpam* remaining, two of whom were former thugs. The *satpam* received three months of intensive training by ABRI to work as security personnel for the cooperative. Interview with Joko.

¹¹⁶ The phrase “*mbuka selokan*” literally means “open at Selokan.” Selokan refers to Selokan Mataram, in the north part of Yogyakarta, further north of UGM.

their possessions to thieves while traveling on the bus. Pickpockets (*copet*) commonly worked in groups. They were often dressed nicely (*necis*), as if they were students or civil servants (*pegawai*).¹¹⁷ According to Joko, many pickpockets were not from Yogyakarta and were in the process of looking for a job in the city. To catch pickpockets, undercover *satpam* traveled on the buses. Occasionally, the undercover *satpam* were assisted by members of BRIMOB (Korps Brigade Mobil, Mobile Brigade Corps). Besides pickpockets, both Nur and Joko agreed that they often had to deal with the bad behavior of certain passengers whom they called “*Irian*”—referring to passengers from Papua, most of whom were university students. According to Nur and Joko, these passengers often refused to pay the correct fare, frequently rode the bus when they were drunk, and sometimes initiated fights.¹¹⁸ If any problems arose when dealing with these “*Irian* passengers,” Joko had the contact number of their *kepala suku* (chieftain) from the Papuan student dormitory in Jalan Kusumanegara.¹¹⁹

As the head of security, Joko was also given the task of preparing for each day’s operational needs. During the peak of KOPATA and *bis kota* in general, Joko started work in the terminal at dawn. He prepared for the day by checking the attendance of bus drivers and *satpam*, and then gave them report forms to fill in during the day. He also received reports from his *satpam* team, and was the main person responsible for solving accident-related problems.

During Petrus (the paramilitary operation known as the Mysterious Killings, *Pembunuhan Misterius*, that took place in 1982–83),¹²⁰ the situation on the street was not conducive to people who were or might appear to be thugs. Joko recalled a driver who went missing at the time, with no member of his family knowing where he went. However, the former thugs who were hired by KOPATA as *satpam* were largely “protected” by the cooperative, because they had received police training and were predominantly under the control of KOPATA and the police. Thus, the cooperative not only allowed the indigenous elite to solidify themselves as a new entrepreneurial class, the new bus system also served as an opportunity to curb the role of thugs in the city, prior to Petrus, and maintain control over informal sovereignties from below.

The End of the Line

Many of the bus drivers we interviewed described how the 1997 financial crisis, and the increase in prices for fuel and spare parts that ensued, helped to bring change, once again, to the *bis kota* system. Above all, however, it was the growth in motorcycle use and mobile phones (which were used to summon rides from family and friends) that were blamed for the steady decline of *bis kota*’s ridership. Between 1987 and 1997, the number of motorcycles in Indonesia increased more than twofold, from about

¹¹⁷ Interview with Joko.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Nur, December 9, 2016. The racial stereotyping of Papuans by people in Yogyakarta who consider themselves Javanese is, unfortunately, fairly common.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Joko.

¹²⁰ For a discussion of Petrus, see Barker, “State of Fear,” 6–43.

5,554,000 to more than 11,735,000.¹²¹ At the same time, the domestic production of motorcycles also increased, from almost one million in 2000 to more than 7,366,000 in 2010—a greater than sevenfold increase during this period.¹²² With an increasingly accessible credit scheme to buy motorcycles, perceptions about *bis kota* also have gradually changed. As Budi, the field coordinator for PUSKOPKAR, put it, even school students now are ashamed to ride *bis kota*; they prefer to use motorcycles instead.¹²³ Many of our informants who were involved in the economy of either *colt kampus* or *bis kota* generally agreed that, during those years, they witnessed an increasing number of private motorcycles on the street.¹²⁴ The *bis kota* system suffered as a result.

In 2007, there were fewer than six hundred city buses in Yogyakarta to serve nineteen licensed routes, with sixteen routes varying in length from twenty-five to sixty-two kilometers (15.5 to 38.4 miles). Three additional routes were shut down because of low demand.¹²⁵ Since the late 1990s, most of the routes had not changed.¹²⁶ Similar to the mafia-controlled Russian taxi system Humphrey studied (noted earlier), Yogyakarta's bus routes were controlled by five powerful cooperatives. Every owner of a bus operating in Yogyakarta was required to be a member of one of the five cooperatives, and each route was shared by no more than two cooperatives.

These cooperatives were able to maintain a powerful position until the early 2000s, because the government relied on them as intermediaries between its regulatory agencies and the over two hundred individuals who held licenses to run public transport on given routes.¹²⁷ The government used the cooperatives to coordinate this large number of license holders, to organize them into routes, and to impose service obligations on them. Yet, by recognizing and delegating to the cooperatives, the city government gave them considerable power over the routes. These cooperatives were able to become powerful also because of their connections to military and political institutions that provided access to vehicles, licenses, and the client networks used for their sideline businesses. Periodically, the government attempted to use regulation to ensure that the quality of vehicles and services were improved, but the cooperatives had a strong monopoly and usually found ways to work around the new regulations. This generated anxiety among scholars and government officials who worried that public transportation in the city was deteriorating at the hands of a self-serving monopoly.¹²⁸

¹²¹ See "Perkembangan jumlah kendaraan bermotor menurut jenis tahun 1987–2013" [Domestic motor vehicle production (unit), 2008–2013], *Badan Pusat Statistik*, last modified December 5, 2014, <http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatistik/view/id/1413>, accessed April 1, 2015.

¹²² See "Produksi kendaraan bermotor dalam negeri (unit), 2008–2013," *Badan Pusat Statistik*, last modified January 8, 2015, <https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatistik/view/id/1065>, accessed December 20, 2016.

¹²³ Interview with Budi, field coordinator for PUSKOPKAR, December 2, 2016.

¹²⁴ Interview with Prapto, October 10, 2016; interview with Nur, June 9, 2015; interview with Sudirman; and interview with Rudi, November 13, 2014.

¹²⁵ Ahmad Munawar, "Sustainable Urban Public Transport Planning in Indonesia, Case Studies in Yogyakarta and Jakarta" (Indonesian Students' Scientific Meeting, Sustainable Development in Indonesia: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Delft University, May 13–15, 2008), 78.

¹²⁶ Munawar, "Sustainable Urban Public Transport Planning in Indonesia," 78.

¹²⁷ Munawar, "Sustainable Urban Public Transport Planning in Indonesia," 78.

¹²⁸ Munawar, "Sustainable Urban Public Transport Planning in Indonesia," 78.

In 2005, the *bis kota* passenger load factor was reported to be only 27 percent, reflecting inefficiency in the system.¹²⁹ In 2006, the cooperatives were given the opportunity to purchase buses with the help of provincial subsidies for three new routes that would have limited bus stops.¹³⁰ This initiative, which was later named Trans Jogja and transformed into a much larger project, was made possible because there was support from the central government for public transportation. With a growing number of motorcycles and private cars on the streets, the Ministry of Transportation started in 2007 to promote initiatives for the development of new transit systems. TransJakarta was the pioneer project, followed by more than thirty other pilot projects in different cities. A new traffic law (Number 22 of 2008) was also passed that encouraged municipal governments to build mass transit systems to meet the growing needs of urban residents.¹³¹ As a result, in 2008 there was yet another reform of Yogyakarta's public transport services with the creation of the Trans Jogja busway.¹³² The new bus system was modeled on the TransJakarta urban transportation renewal project, with newly constructed raised bus stops (*halte*), elevated air-conditioned buses, reliable routes and schedules, and all at an extremely low cost to passengers. Also in 2008, Yogyakarta's provincial government began implementing the first phase of a US\$61 million transportation modernization program, designed to tackle the city's problems of traffic, pollution, and degrading livability.

Many of the cooperatives' leaders were involved in the formation of PT Jogja Tugu Trans (PTJTT), Trans Jogja's private partner company, and some played prominent roles. For instance, Pak Adi, the former head of ASPADA, became the director of human resources at PTJTT. When the city bus cooperatives were restructuring and merging to form PTJTT in order to operate Trans Jogja, each cooperative was asked to put forward a list of recommended employees to work as drivers, stewards, and operations staff. There were opportunities to find permanent, full-time employment in the new system, and from the bus drivers we interviewed, we know that city bus drivers were heavily recruited for Trans Jogja. Becoming a Trans Jogja employee was like getting a quasi-government job, one that had a clear work schedule and a guaranteed minimum wage with some benefits. However, it also required at least a junior high school diploma, something that many bus drivers, *kenek*, and others did not have.¹³³

¹²⁹ This number is based on a survey conducted by the Department of Transportation, Communication and Informatics at Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, with the Transportation Engineering Graduate Program at UGM (interview with Deni, field officer at Trans Jogja Technical Unit of Department of Transportation, Communication and Informatics, November 17, 2014).

¹³⁰ "Proyek bus patas: Sejumlah koperasi 'sharing' membeli bus" [Express bus project: A number of cooperatives pitch in to buy bus], *Kompas*, February 17, 2006.

¹³¹ Aleksander Purba, Fumihiko Nakamura, and Shinji Tanaka, "An Evaluation of New Transit System for Viewpoint of Institutional Framework" (Case Studies: Jogjakarta and Palembang, Proceedings of International Alliance for Sustainable Urbanization and Regeneration, October 24–27, 2014, Kashiwa, Japan, pp. 234–43).

¹³² Trans Jogja is operated by PT Jogja Tugu Trans, owned by a consortium comprising Koperasi Pemuda, KOPATA, Aspada, and Puskopkar cooperatives and the state-owned transportation company DAMRI.

¹³³ The Trans Jogja bus drivers make approximately Rp 2,860 per month (in April 2014, US\$1 averaged 11,451.95 IDR), about twice the minimum wage. "PT JTT jarang dilibatkan bahas kenaikan gaji kru Trans Jogja" [PT JTT is rarely involved in discussing salary increases for the Trans Jogja crew], *Tribun Jogja*, April 30, 2014.

Not all people joined the Trans Jogja system, however. Many of those remaining in the *bis kota* economy now rely on renting their buses as charters for trips (*bis charteran*). University students and neighborhood associations are typical customers for charter buses—for example, they might rent a bus to visit a sick neighbor; attend a wedding, *pengajian* (Quran recitation), pilgrimage, or funeral; or go to the beach or mountain for a picnic. Many people who remained in the *bis kota* system feel betrayed by the government for slowly pushing them out of business.¹³⁴ In 2018, there remain only a few *bis kota* buses in the city, and their passengers are mostly people who commute daily to certain areas, which are served by existing KOPATA routes in the southern part of Yogyakarta. These commuters are mainly senior citizens, traders at Beringharjo Traditional Market, and a small number of students. Nowadays, there is only one cooperative, KOPATA, and DAMRI operating in two separate areas within the city. DAMRI currently also uses Trans Jogja bus stops along the route to Yogyakarta's international airport.

While the provincial government has continued to renew and expand the number of Trans Jogja buses, they also expanded the routes to seventeen lines in 2017.¹³⁵ The Trans Jogja management has tried to persuade people to use Trans Jogja through social media platforms,¹³⁶ but the number of passengers on Trans Jogja remains low. In 2018, the head of Trans Jogja's Technical Operational Unit (Unit Pelaksana Teknis, UPT) blamed the downturn of passengers on increased traffic and Trans Jogja's inability to have its own bus line.¹³⁷ Others have blamed the advent of new online transportation systems like GO-JEK and Grab, as well as affordable motorcycle and car leases offered by dealers, leasing companies, and banks.¹³⁸

While the shift from *colt kampus* to the *bis kota* system allowed for a specific social formation that generated and formalized its own systems of regulation and security, the transition to Trans Jogja has also created a new network. The transition to Trans Jogja has allowed certain individuals to consolidate their economic power and control over this new transportation system, while others have been sidelined. The study of transportation infrastructures, especially those being phased out or newly developed, allow for the understanding of state power and the relationship to those who informally wield power.

¹³⁴ Interview with Toni, a Puskopkar bus driver and leader of the bus driver and *kenek* association, May 20, 2015; interview with Nur, June 9, 2015; and informal talk with Santo, a Kopata bus driver, November 11, 2014.

¹³⁵ “128 armada Trans Jogja disiapkan jangkau 17 jalur” [128 Trans Jogja fleet prepared to reach 17 lanes], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, March 7, 2017.

¹³⁶ Field notes by Khidir Marsanto Prawirosusanto, May 16, 2018.

¹³⁷ “UPT Trans Jogja kaji bus line untuk prioritaskan Trans Jogja” [UPT Trans Jogja investigates bus line in order to prioritize Trans Jogja], *Tribune Jogja*, June 25, 2018.

¹³⁸ “Jalanan macet, pendapatan Trans Jogja ‘seret’” [Congested roads, Trans Jogja revenues are ‘dragging’], *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, December 7, 2017.