Enhancing road service compliance: a robust penalty model for efficient maintenance management

The long segment scheme allowing contractors to oversee road maintenance still has drawbacks. For example, non-compliance, such as delaying preservation for road issues, persists due to small penalties. This leads service providers to neglect road performance without objection to fines. This research aims to provide sufficient incentives for contractors to comply with the implementation of the late delivery penalty rate of road service levels. This research used an experimental method to test two formulas for the late delivery penalty rate of road service levels on two road sections in Central Java and Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. During the experiment, the time taken by service providers to fulfill the road service level on the two different road sections was measured and recorded. In the first road section, the previously used formula resulted in a penalty of only $7.39, while the developed formula yielded $122.17. Furthermore, in the second road section, the government formula led to a penalty of $375.89, whereas the developed formula resulted in a fine amount of $1,468.99. The results showed that the penalty value given to contractors for two road segment trials using the research formula was 16 and 4 times higher than the formula used by the Directorate General of Highways. In addition, the developed formula takes into account other road performance indicators such as potholes with a diameter < 10 cm and depth < 4 cm, ponding, and uneven patching.